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SECRECY IN CONTEXT: THE SHADOWY LIFE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION
MINNA J. KOTKIN*
INTRODUCTION
When did civil rights violations stop being considered a matter of in-
terest and concern to the public? The articles in this Symposium on secrecy
in litigation all focus on the public harm wrought by secrecy in litigation,
but they largely ignore the category of cases that account for a substantial
proportion of secret settlements in the federal courts. Indeed, civil rights
litigation now represents some fourteen percent of federal cases filed.1
Extrapolating from available statistics, it is fair to assume that close to sev-
enty percent of these cases are resolved by what I term "invisible settle-
ments."'2 According to court records, these cases are concluded by
stipulations of dismissal, just as if the plaintiff decided to withdraw the
action. The terms of settlement are contained in private contracts, protected
from public attention by confidentiality clauses that bar plaintiffs and their
attorneys from revealing even the existence of the agreements. The notion
that settlement entails "bargaining in the shadow of the law" is well estab-
lished.3 If the trend towards invisible settlements is not abated, the shadows
will overwhelm the law.
The secrecy surrounding employment discrimination is not limited to
settlement terms, however. Today, secrecy pervades every aspect of assert-
ing a claim, from getting into court in the first place to appealing a final
decision.4 In her article for this Symposium and in other work, Judith Res-
* Professor of Law and Director, Workers' Rights Clinic, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 547 tbl.A-12 (2004).
2. Clermont and Schwab's statistical analyses show that close to seventy percent of employment
discrimination cases are terminated by settlement, and the small percentage of cases falling into an
"other-disposition" category (e.g., those that are remanded or transferred to another court) will also
likely end up settling. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,440 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
4. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 688 (2000). For example, it is fair to say that judges rely on
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nik traces the pervasive trend towards concealing and privatizing dispute
resolution. 5 In this essay, my goal is to show how that trend has worked
over the last twenty-five years to change the nature of employment dis-
crimination litigation, and as a consequence, to create the public perception
that discrimination in the workplace is largely a thing of the past.
This Symposium itself is evidence of the degree to which employment
discrimination is off the radar in the secrecy debate. By and large, the au-
thors concentrate on the impact of secrecy in the context of products liabil-
ity, toxic torts, and to a lesser extent, individual malfeasance, such as
malpractice or sexual abuse. 6 In these situations, of course, each instance of
secrecy holds the potential to injure some identifiable segment of the pub-
lic. As Robert Timothy Reagan and Richard Marcus point out, the conven-
tional secrecy narrative involves discovery that the defendant manufacturer
had knowledge that its product was defective, but that evidence, as well as
the terms of the settlement, are kept confidential, thus allowing the product
to remain on the market, continuing to cause harm.7 That courts should
look closely before countenancing this result is hardly debatable.8 The
harm to the public is concrete and immediate.
In contrast, the harm created by secrecy in employment discrimination
litigation is cumulative and less immediately tangible. A protective order or
confidential settlement agreement may have some impact on similarly situ-
ated employees who later bring suit. They will not have access to relevant
discovery produced in prior discrimination litigation. Nor will they be able
to support their claims by showing that similar actions have been settled for
oral arguments less and less at the federal appellate level, even when requested by appellants. In ap-
proximately sixty percent of cases in the federal appeals courts, judges reach their decisions without
hearing oral arguments. Id. at 700. Unpublished opinions, unheard of in earlier decades, are permitted in
every circuit. Id. at 701-02.
5. See generally Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing and Discovering How the Public Dimensions
of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CH.-KENT L.
REV. 357 (2006); Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public
Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 Cut-KENT L. REV. 375 (2006); Richard L.
Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (At Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery Is
Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006); Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed
Settlement Agreements, 81 CHu.-KENT L. REv. 439 (2006).
7. Marcus, supra note 6, at 336; Reagan, supra note 6, at 439.
8. All of the authors in this Symposium basically agree on this point. See, e.g., Erichson, supra
note 6, at 368-69 (acknowledging that stipulated protective orders ought to be denied or modified where
public safety is at stake); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 403 (asserting that discovery often produces infor-
mation of vital public importance, especially when it relates to hazardous products or a company's
longstanding practice of discrimination); Marcus, supra note 6, at 331 (noting that the court has discretion
to deny a defendant's request for confidentiality in a product liability case where public safety is implicated);
Reagan, supra note 6, at 455 (identifying products liability cases as likely to be of special public inter-
est).
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substantial sums. But the real harm results from the collective disappear-
ance of settlements from public view. That harm manifests itself in several
ways.9 First, although the confidential payment of a substantial settlement
may create specific deterrence, it does not serve the general deterrence
purposes fundamental to the employment discrimination statutes.10 Second,
confidential contractual settlements mask favorable outcomes for plaintiffs,
and thereby fuel the perception-common among the judiciary and conser-
vative commentators-that employment discrimination claims are largely
frivolous." 1 The only publicly available aggregate data on outcomes are
based upon the 3.7 percent of civil rights claims that end in trials. 12 Based
on these data, several empirical studies have concluded that very few plain-
tiffs actually prevail in their claims. 13 Finally, the prevalence of confiden-
tial agreements results in a negligible settlement database. The absence of
benchmarks hampers plaintiffs' attorneys when counseling clients and ne-
gotiating with employers, and hinders mediators and judges in effectively
assisting in the settlement process.14
I have written at length about the genesis and effect of confidential
private settlements in the employment discrimination context, and I have
suggested some remedial measures that could reverse this trend. 15 In this
essay, I look more generally at how secrecy has come to pervade many
aspects of the process of litigating employment discrimination claims.
What follows is a comparative snapshot of that process, looking at the
procedural and substantive changes in the law over the last twenty-five
years and demonstrating how the various concerns about secrecy expressed
in this series of articles play out in practice. For this contextualized cri-
tique, I draw largely on my personal experience litigating these claims; my
9. See generally Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004). This case is
discussed later in this Article. See infra note 112.
10. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2006) (manuscript at 104, on file with author).
11. Id. (manuscript at 104-05).
12. Galanter, supra note 1, at 463 tbl.l.
13. E.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 441. See also David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Dis-
charge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
511, 516, 535 (2003) (reporting that, in California, 50% of plaintiffs won verdicts in statutory discrimi-
nation cases, but that "when certain core areas of employment discrimination [are] isolated, it [be-
comes] clear [that] ... employment discrimination cases are very hard to win"); Michael Selmi, Why
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557-61 (2001) (stating
that plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits generally fare worse than most other types of civil
plaintiffs).
14. See Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and
Uses, JUDGES' J., Winter 2004, at 19, 21-22 (2004).
15. See generally Kotkin, supra note 10.
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experience conveniently began in 1980-first as the litigation director of a
public interest organization, and then as the director of a federal litigation
clinical program at Brooklyn Law School. 16 Indeed, the need to rely on
anecdotal evidence, rather than hard data, is part of the problem engendered
by secrecy.
I. BRINGING A CLAIM
In 1980, employment discrimination claimants could at least be as-
sured of their right to bring a complaint in federal or state court, and of the
potential for a jury trial in some circumstances. 17 In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., the Supreme Court held that even when an employee's allega-
tions of racial discrimination had been resolved against him in a labor arbi-
tration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, he was not precluded
from bringing a de novo Title VII action in federal court.18 The Court
found that Congress clearly had assigned the role of enforcing the antidis-
crimination laws to the courts and had created a special role for plaintiffs in
"vindicat[ing] the important congressional policy against discriminatory
employment practices."' 19 Thus, preclusion through arbitration would con-
travene the public function of Title VII.20 Moreover, de novo consideration
was necessary because arbitrators had no authority to interpret federal
law.2 1
Gardner-Denver stood firmly for the primacy of the courts as the pub-
lic and exclusive forum for the resolution of discrimination claims, until the
Supreme Court abruptly reversed direction in 1991. In Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that an age discrimination claim
was subject to a mandatory arbitration provision covering employment-
16. The Federal Litigation Clinic, which I founded in 1984 and directed until 2004, primarily
represented plaintiffs in employment discrimination matters. In the early years of the clinic, confidenti-
ality was a term subject to negotiation in settlement discussions, but more recently it had become a
given. When we objected to confidentiality, opposing counsel would question whether our client was
willing to make the term a "deal-breaker." In the end, almost all clients were unwilling to forego a
settlement on this basis, much as they objected what they viewed as a "gag order."
17. Until 1991, jury trials in federal court were available only in race discrimination cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and in claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 189, 190
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2000)). Title VII claims were considered equitable in
nature. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided for jury trials in actions brought under Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(c) (2000).
18. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60(1974).
19. Id. at 45.
20. See id. at 51.
21. Id. at53-54.
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related disputes.22 It flatly rejected the argument that judicial determina-
tions of discrimination claims not only resolve individual grievances but
also provide the only possible forum for furthering broad social policies.
The Court took the view that the assertion of a statutory discrimination
claim in arbitration could serve both remedial and deterrent goals, and the
public purpose of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
could be vindicated through either judicial resolution or arbitration.23 Thus,
as long as workers could effectively pursue claims in the arbitral forum, the
statutory purpose of the ADEA was served.24 Gardner-Denver could be
distinguished, the Court asserted, because it had presented only the issue of
whether arbitration of a statutory claim precluded subsequent judicial reso-
lution, and had not been decided under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), which favors arbitration. 25 Nor was the Court troubled by the
coercive nature of these employment contracts; contract law provides suffi-
cient protection.26 As to the contention that arbitration prevents public
knowledge of discrimination, the Court noted that the applicable rules re-
quired written award decisions to be made available to the public.27 More-
over, the Court noted that litigation also can be resolved by private
confidential settlements. 28 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court
expanded the Gilmer holding, interpreting the FAA to encompass all em-
ployment contracts except for those involving transportation workers. 29 As
Geraldine Mohr cogently summed up Gilmer, "The Court thus subsumed
the statute's broader goal, ending workplace age discrimination, into the
more limited goal of ensuring that individuals obtain a remedy for a dis-
crimination injury, thus crediting only one public policy."'30
Not surprisingly, the percentage of private employers arbitrating em-
ployment disputes grew from 3.6 percent in 1991 to 19 percent in 1997. 31
According to one empirical study of employment arbitration, the American
22. 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991).
23. Id. at 27-28.
24. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
25. Id. at 35.
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. Id. at 31-32.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
30. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 418 (1999).
31. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 779
(2003). Hill notes that American Arbitration Association is the "the leading independent provider of
private employment arbitration in the United States." Id. at 780.
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Arbitration Association reports that its employment dispute caseload "dou-
bled in three years between 1993 and 1996, and the number of employees
covered by AAA employment arbitration plans grew from three million in
1997, to six million in 2002."32
It is difficult to imagine why these figures are not even higher. Em-
ployers have little to lose and much to gain by insisting on the arbitration of
discrimination claims. Not only is the defense quicker and less expensive,
the result is effectively shielded from public view, despite the Supreme
Court's assertion otherwise. According to Professor Mohr, in the securities
industry, for example, awards may be publicly available, but they are not
published or indexed; access requires knowledge of the case number and a
visit to the organization that administers the system. 33 Payment of a fee is
required to access the AAA employment award database. 34
Laurie Kratky Dor6's article in this Symposium addresses the scope of
arbitration confidentiality at length, noting that "[p]redispute arbitration
agreements frequently contain express confidentiality provisions," as do the
rules adopted by dispute resolution organizations. 35 There is no public
docket, and no opportunity for the public to attend proceedings. To the
extent awards are not subject to a confidentiality agreement, they "may
consist solely of a concise, unsupported disposition. '36
Professor Dor6 also explores the likelihood that an arbitration clause
mandating confidentiality would be struck down as unconscionable based
upon the unequal bargaining power of the parties, or as contrary to public
policy. 37 Her research indicates that only one court-the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington-has invalidated a confidentiality provision in the
employment context, 38 while several federal circuits have refused to do
SO. 39 Invasion of confidentiality can sometimes be achieved if a prevailing
claimant seeks judicial confirmation of the award, but few claimants have
reason to resort to the courts for enforcement. 40
Dor6 concludes that arbitration should be subject to greater transpar-
ency when issues of statutory rights and public policy are at stake. She
32. Id.
33. Moohr, supra note 30, at 431 n.188.
34. See American Arbitration Association, Publications Order Form,
http://www.adr.org/secured/publicationsorder.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
35. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 463,483 (2006).
36. Id. at 485.
37. Id. at 501-06.
38. See id. at 502 & n.212.
39. Id. at 503.
40. Id. at 507.
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provides no specific proposal for accomplishing that result, however, other
than to suggest that "in cases of obvious public interest"-those involving
threats to public health and safety-at least the existence of and parties to
the dispute should be publicly disclosed, and awards and findings should be
published.4 1
Although Dor6 does not challenge the Gilmer holding, her article calls
into question the underlying premises upon which that decision rests. Con-
trary to the Supreme Court's assumptions, contract law has not provided an
effective vehicle to challenge arbitration clauses imposed as a condition of
employment. Nor is there any evidence that awards are generally available
to the public. Even if arbitration organizations do not require that awards be
kept secret, confidentiality provisions are typically included in underlying
employment agreements that mandate arbitration of employment disputes.
That litigation often ends in secret settlements does not justify the confi-
dentiality terms imposed by contracts of adhesion. At least confidentiality
in litigation is a negotiated term that theoretically can be rejected by the
plaintiff.
In the absence of legislation that overturns or modifies Gilmer, an ef-
fort now underway, 42 undoubtedly the trend towards arbitration clauses in
employment contracts will continue to rise exponentially. Arbitration is
generally thought of as being more expeditious and inexpensive than litiga-
tion, and guarantees of confidentiality may be equally available. But more
importantly, arbitration eliminates the one characteristic of employment
litigation that strikes fear in the hearts of employers: the possibility of a
jury trial. If the trend towards arbitration continues, concerns over secrecy
in litigation will pale in comparison to harm caused by the complete invisi-
bility of alternative dispute resolutions.
II. CASE MANAGEMENT AND DISCOVERY
The concerns about secrecy in discovery discussed in this Symposium
relate primarily to protective orders or confidentiality agreements that
shield a "smoking gun" from public view. For example, several authors
examine decisions that concern the sealing of documents in the defective
tire cases, where the media mounted a concerted effort to invade court or-
41. Id. at 519.
42. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 31, at 781 (noting the lobbying effort currently underway to curtail
the Circuit City ruling); National Employment Lawyers Association, Advocacy: Mandatory Arbitration,
http://www.nela.org/advocacy/mandarbitration.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (describing NELA as "a
leader in opposing compulsory arbitration of employment claims," and detailing NELA's efforts).
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ders in the interest of public health and safety.43 In employment discrimina-
tion litigation, one set of secrecy concerns relates to procedural changes
that have removed any sense of transparency from the discovery process.
In 1980, after a complaint was filed, the defendant employer typically
would serve an answer along with extensive interrogatories and requests
for documents, and the plaintiff would respond with her own discovery
requests. Either by stipulation or court order, the thirty-day time limit for
responses would be extended more than once. I have previously written of
my early career in a large firm where associates were kept busy drafting
hundreds of interrogatories, crafting clever objections to the interrogatories
of the adversaries, and drafting and responding to Rule 37 motions. As
written decisions were usual in these pre-magistrate days, discovery could
be put on hold for months.44 Argument before the assigned judge com-
monly would be the first judicial involvement in the matter.
By the early 1980s, it was apparent that this process had gotten out of
hand in terms of "gaming," delay, and expense. The first major change
came in 1980 with an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 in
response to what the Advisory Committee described as "widespread criti-
cism of abuse of discovery. ' 45 The new section (f) encouraged the parties
to negotiate a discovery plan and schedule. If counsel attempted to reach a
reasonable agreement without success, she could seek a conference with
the court.46 Although modest in scope, this elective process signaled the
beginning of what Judith Resnik called-presciently in 1982--"managerial
judging. '47 This new vision of the judicial role marked the beginning of
two interrelated developments: the increase in secrecy and the decrease in
trials. Conferences in chambers replaced motion arguments, and provided
the opportunity not only to resolve disputes but to discuss-if not strongly
advocate for-settlement.
The 1983 rules amendments substantially furthered judicial involve-
ment in the discovery and settlement process. First, Rule 16, governing pre-
trial conferences, which had not been changed since the adoption of the
rules in 1938, was "extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the chal-
lenges of modern litigation. '48 The Advisory Committee made its goals
43. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 375-76 (describing Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 853 A.2d 880 (N.J. 2004)); Marcus, supra note 6, at 353-54 (discussing Chi. Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
44. Minna J. Kotkin, Discovery in the Real World, 46 FLA. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1994).
45. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 526 (1980) (advisory
committee note).
46. Id. at 526-27.
47. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 amendments.
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explicit: if a judge "intervenes personally at an early stage to assume judi-
cial control over a case ... [it will be] disposed of by settlement or trial
more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left
to their own devices."'49 The new rule mandated that a scheduling order
governing discovery and motions be entered within 120 days, and it
strongly encouraged an early pre-trial conference. 50 Prior to the amend-
ment, the discretionary pre-trial conference generally was held late in the
process to discuss trial-related issues. The new rule also made settlement
discussions part of the conference agenda because "settlement should be
facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible," and it explicitly
suggested exploration "of procedures other than litigation to resolve the
dispute."'51 Finally, the rule authorized judges to require that parties be
present or available by telephone to consider possible settlement.52 More
extensive amendments went into effect in 1993 and in 2000. Mandatory
initial disclosure was adopted; 53 interrogatories were limited to twenty-five
in number 54 and depositions to not more than seven hours;55 and a specific
provision for sanctioning discovery abuse was included.56 In the New York
federal district courts, parties were required to confer before seeking judi-
cial intervention in any discovery dispute. 57 If intervention was still neces-
sary, a party had to notify the court of the impasse. Usually, a magistrate
judge assigned for all discovery purposes would then resolve the issues
orally at a discovery conference. 58 Formal Rule 37 motions became a thing
of the past.
What does discovery reform have to do with secrecy? Certainly in-
creased judicial management of discovery has had salutary effects in terms
of expedition and economy. But in fact, the secrecy that results as a by-
product of discovery reform creates problems closely analogous to those of
secret settlements. The informal processes dictated by the Rules amend-
ments facilitate courts' unexamined approval of confidentiality orders,
shield discovery disputes from consideration in open court, and substan-
49. Id. See generally Charles A. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of Bench
and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1991).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 amendments.
52. FED. R. Cwv.P. 16.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 amendments to Rules.
54. FED. R. CIv. P. 33, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 amendments to Rules.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 30, Notes of Advisory Committee on 2000 amendments.
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 26, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 amendments to Rules.
57. E.D.N.Y. LOCAL Civ. R. 37.3(a), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf.
58. Id. at 37.3(c), 37.3(e).
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tially reduce the number of written opinions, thus inhibiting the creation of
precedent.
Consider how these informal processes play out in the typical em-
ployment discrimination matter.59 A plaintiff claiming sex discrimination
in a promotion decision, for example, undoubtedly will seek in discovery
the personnel file of the worker who received the promotion and the per-
sonnel files of other similarly situated workers, in order to show a pattern
of discrimination as one means of overcoming the employer's assertion of a
legitimate basis for denying the promotion to the litigant. The plaintiff also
will request any prior internal and external complaints of sex discrimina-
tion and any studies or evaluations relating to the promotion of women.
The employer will object, often relying on the "privacy rights" of other
employees, and perhaps asserting a "self-evaluative," work product, or
attomey-client privilege.
Pre-discovery reform, a Rule 37 motion would ensue. That motion
would entail the filing in the court record of the discovery requests and the
employer's responses, along with affidavits and memoranda of law. Often,
the employer would cross-move for a protective order. The motions would
be set for argument on the judge's regularly scheduled motion day, and
they would be noted in the publicly available court calendar. Argument
would be heard in the courtroom, with any interested party able to observe.
The judge would be required explicitly to consider the relevance of the
material sought, the legitimacy of the claim to privilege, and the existence
of good cause for confidentiality, perhaps after in camera review of dis-
puted documents. The decision would take the form of a written opinion,
which--even if not published-would become part of the court record.
Today, the process looks very different. The same discovery disputes
arise, but now counsel first must confer in an attempt to resolve them. That
discussion inevitably involves a request by the defendant for an umbrella
confidentiality order, if counsel have not already agreed to secrecy. As
Judith Resnik notes, "anecdotal evidence supports the thesis that discovery
confidentiality clauses are routinely included as a predicate to the initial
disclosures, making non-disclosure the baseline from which special nego-
tiations are required to enable the information to be revealed to others." 60
59. See generally Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment
Discrimination If She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances: The Need for Broad Workforce and
Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 159 (1996) (examining the necessity of broad
discovery to prove disparate treatment claims).
60. Resnik, supra note 5, at 555.
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If no resolution is reached, the parties must request a conference,
which often occurs in a magistrate judge's chambers. The magistrate judge
will mediate the disputes and attempt to reach practical and expedient solu-
tions. Only the result is recorded in a short order. An attempt by the plain-
tiff to resist confidentiality will not be met with approval, given the
pressure of the judicial docket. If plaintiff's counsel persists, the magistrate
judge may well respond, "You can make your motion to compel, of
course," sending the clear message that it will be a futile effort. Moreover,
this process takes place against the backdrop of a scheduling order with a
discovery cut-off date, which has become a powerful tool not only to en-
courage settlement, but also to compel cooperation in discovery.
As a substantive matter, whether the material of the sort described
above sought in discovery should be publicly available is open to debate.
From a process perspective, however, it is questionable whether the appro-
priate balance has been reached between efficiency and economy on the
one hand, and on the other the secrecy engendered by "discovery reform."
In this Symposium, Andrew Goldstein and Howard Erichson both argue
that the courts should look more closely before rubber-stamping confiden-
tiality orders, and should be mindful of any public interest at stake.61 Such
heightened review requires at least a small step backwards to a more formal
discovery process.
Richard Marcus, on the other hand, takes the view that discovery
should not be, and was never meant to be, presumptively public. Looking at
the history of discovery, Marcus contends that the rules on their face show
that public access to discovery was not a goal, noting that there was never a
provision requiring the fruits of Rule 34 document requests to be filed in
court. 62 By focusing on document production, however, Marcus is correct
when he suggests in conclusion that his essay "attacks a straw man."'63 It is
true that the boxes-and sometimes rooms--of documents produced in
response to a Rule 34 request were never presumed to be public. But con-
sider the range of discovery that was a matter of public record prior to
1980. Deposition transcripts were required to be filed, including all exhib-
its, which as a practical matter would encompass most critical documents
gleaned from document production.64 In addition, interrogatory responses
and document request responses (which may or may not have included the
61. Erichson, supra note 6, at 359; Goldstein, supra note 6, at 379.
62. Marcus, supra note 6, at 345-46.
63. Id. at 355.
64. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 525 (1980) (demon-
strating how the 1980 amendment to Rule 5(d) altered the filing requirements related to discovery
materials).
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documents themselves), responses to requests for admissions, as well as all
motions directed to compelling discovery, were part of the court record. 65
In 1980, Rule 5(d) was amended to allow district courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether discovery materials should be filed. The
Advisory Committee's notes indicate the amendment was addressed solely
to pragmatic concerns: "the copies required for filing are an added expense
and the large volume of discovery filings presents serious problems of stor-
age in some districts."' 66 However, the Committee chose not to prohibit
filing because "such materials are sometimes of interest to those who may
have no access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as members
of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally. '67
Marcus discounts this comment as evidence of required public access
to discovery product, because coming more than forty years after the adop-
tion of the rules, "[i]t hardly shows that the drafters in the 1930s had [pub-
lic access] in mind."'68 But, how crucial is original intent to the current
debate about public access? Marcus, himself, acknowledges that in the
1970s, when the proposal to end the filing requirements was first made, it
was amidst heated debate about public access to discovery.69 Thus, even if
the original intent was not to provide public access to such documents, the
advisory comment makes clear that, by the 1980s, it was widely recognized
that filing also served this important function.
As additional support for his argument, Marcus also notes that Rule
5(d) was further amended in 2000 to forbid filing of any discovery.70 How-
ever, the Advisory Committee's notes to the 2000 amendment show that
the bar on filing was simply a further effort to keep the courthouses from
being overwhelmed with paper. In the year following the 1980 amendment,
many districts adopted local rules that forbade filing.71 The 2000 amend-
ment was designed to achieve uniformity. 72
The combination of amendments that mandate judicial management of
the discovery process and that eliminate discovery product filing has made
confidentiality the default position. The legal standard for confidentiality
orders--discussed at length in this Symposium-has little practical appli-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Marcus, supra note 6, at 346 n.62.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b), Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendment.
72. Id. The committee found "no apparent reason to have different filing rules in different dis-
tricts" and focused solely on the resources that might be required to maintain such filing across districts.
Id.
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cation in these circumstances. Technology offers a simple solution, how-
ever. With the advent of electronic filing, courthouse storage capacity
should no longer drive the calculus between public access and appropriate
protection of sensitive information. The rules should be amended to require
the electronic filing of deposition transcripts and interrogatory answers. A
court order demonstrating good cause should be necessary to justify any
departure from this procedure, as was the case prior to 1980, and absent
local rule until 2000.
III. SETTLEMENT VS. TRIAL
As several authors note, the problem of confidential settlements (as
well as confidential discovery) would not be of such concern were it not for
another trend in dispute resolution: the "vanishing trial" phenomenon. 73
When some significant proportion of cases is resolved by trial, open to the
public and the media, confidential discovery and settlements are less dam-
aging in the aggregate. Even if one products liability claim against a par-
ticular manufacturer is secretly settled, another will go to trial. Testimony
and documents relating to the product's safety will come to light. Similarly,
a major employer may evade publicity by settling some Title VII claims,
but eventually a trial will highlight its discriminatory practices. As trials
disappear, however, the effect of secrecy becomes more pronounced.
Marc Galanter's recent empirical study demonstrates that the drop in
civil trials has been "recent and steep."'74 Not surprisingly, this trend coin-
cides with the advent of "managerial judging" and the increase of alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms.75 The number of federal court trials
peaked in 1985.76 In 1962, matters resolved during or after trial accounted
for 11.5% of civil dispositions; 77 in 2005, the figure was 1.5%.78 Because
some proportion of these cases settle during trial, the real percentage of
matters actually resolved by fact finders, with a publicly available verdict,
is even smaller.
One significant impact of what Galanter calls the "trial implosion" is
the decreasing availability of settlement benchmarks derived from factual
73. See, e.g., Dor&, supra note 35, at 478; Goldstein, supra note 6, at 403; Resnik, supra note 5, at
534.
74. Galanter, supra note 1, at 461.
75. Id. at 459-60.
76. Id. at 461.
77. Id. at 461,465 fig.2.
78. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 2005, at 51 tbl.C-4 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/front/mar05title.pdf.
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adjudications. 79 Without reliable estimates of trial outcomes, "there is noth-
ing to cast a shadow in which the parties can bargain," as Janet Cooper
Alexander commented in describing the world of securities class action
litigation, where-she asserts-virtually all cases settle.80 Once removed
from trial adjudications, reports of settlements serve a similar function.
When settlements are confidential, however, the shadow truly ceases to
exist.
The Federal Judicial Center's ("FJC") study of sealed settlements, de-
scribed in this Symposium by Robert Timothy Reagan, reveals definitively
what most federal court litigators would have assumed: secrecy rarely re-
sults from a court order.81 But the conclusions drawn by Reagan reveal
how the secrecy debate has largely bypassed civil rights matters. Reagan
suggests that secrecy concerns are overblown because sealed settlements
occur in less than one-half of one percent of cases. 82 Even then, Reagan
concludes that "most of the cases with sealed settlement agreements are not
cases the public would be especially interested in," and that typically only
the amount of the settlement is confidential. 83 Moreover, he asserts that
secrecy is ameliorated by the availability of the complaint and docket sheet
in 97% of the sealed cases. 84
In determining whether most of the sealed matters were cases "of spe-
cial public interest," the FJC assigned to this category 258 products liability
cases, and smaller numbers of environmental, professional malpractice,
sexual abuse, public defendant, and other matters involving very serious
personal injuries. 85 Using this categorization, the study asserts that only
40% of the sample of 1270 sealed cases were "of special public interest."'86
But, the FJC's notion of "public interest" is quite narrow indeed: as An-
drew Goldstein notes, it excludes 223 cases categorized as "other employ-
ment/labor," 124 as "other civil rights," and an additional 88 Fair Labor
Standards Act cases, which require that settlements be judicially ap-
proved. 87 Moreover, the FJC's categorization has turned the public/private
distinction on its head. Purely private common law disputes are considered
79. Galanter, supra note 1, at 522, 526.
80. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 567 (1991), quoted in Galanter, supra note 1, at 526.
81. Reagan, supra note 6, at 439.
82. Id. at 452.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 458.
85. Id. at 454-58.
86. Id. at 458.
87. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 390.
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matters of public interest, while constitutional and statutory civil rights
claims are relegated to the private sphere.
Not only does the FJC study fail to address secrecy in the civil rights
context, but it also sheds little light on the real issues of concern about se-
crecy. The study acknowledges only in passing that many cases are settled
by confidential private contracts not filed with the court, and for which no
sealing orders are necessary. Moreover, it seems to find secrecy excusable
to the extent that only the amount of the settlement is concealed. In fact, the
dollar amount of the plaintiff's recovery is the only matter of interest in
settlement stipulations. Access to discovery documents may show the basis
of liability and protect the public from harm, but settlement agreements do
not contain factual findings and invariably deny liability.88 Particularly
with regard to employment discrimination, where physical injury does not
set the parameters for recovery, the amount of the settlement is the only
indication of whether the defendant likely engaged in wrongdoing. Con-
sider for example the impact of a settlement of one million dollars in a
sexual harassment case compared to ten thousand dollars. As trials disap-
pear and discovery product is kept out of the courthouse, settlement infor-
mation is the only data available by which to evaluate the extent of
discrimination in the workplace.
"Sunshine" legislation--described at length by Andrew Goldstein-
suffers from the same infirmities as the FJC study. First, as Goldstein notes,
state laws like Florida's that prohibit or restrict orders or judgments that
conceal public hazards cannot reach confidential private settlements unless
there is a breach of the settlement agreement and the law is asserted as a
defense. 89 Second, the right of third parties, such as the media, to intervene
is meaningless if there is no public notice or record of a settlement. 90 Fi-
nally, the laws are not drafted broadly enough to encompass employment
discrimination: they refer, for example, to "matters that have a probable
adverse effect upon the general public health or safety." 9 1 Louisiana's law
refers to agreements that conceal a public hazard or contain information
88. See Reagan, supra note 6, at 459-60.
89. Goldstein, supra not 6, at 432.
90. Id. at 425. Note that Texas addressed this problem via Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76(3),
which provides that court records, which are presumptively public,
may only be sealed upon a party's written motion, which shall be open to public inspection.
The movant shall post a public notice... stating: that a hearing will be held in open court on
a motion to seal court records in the specific case; that any person may intervene and be heard
concerning the sealing of court records; the specific time and place of the hearing; the style
and number of the case; a brief but specific description of both the nature of the case and the
records which are sought to be sealed; and the identity of the movant.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2).
91. Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(c); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 430.
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"which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves
from injury which may result from the public hazard. '92 Even the most
creative lawyer would have difficulty arguing that these statutes reach em-
ployment discrimination settlements.
The degree to which employment discrimination is ignored in the se-
crecy debate is rooted in a broader issue: the privatization of civil rights
litigation. That trend is manifest in the Supreme Court's turnabout regard-
ing arbitrability, discussed above. But well before the 1991 Gilmer deci-
sion, the Court began to move away from the view that employment
discrimination claims serve a public function.
In 1980, secret settlements were not the norm in employment dis-
crimination litigation because of the process by which settlements were
structured. When Title VII was enacted, Congress adopted the "private
attorney general" enforcement mechanism to eliminate bias in the work-
place. 93 Because the enforcement of this important social policy was be-
yond the government's resources, private actions were authorized, and
counsel would be made available to litigants by the allowance of fee-
shifting. 94 Unlike in torts actions, where attorneys collected a contingency
fee from the plaintiffs recovery, the employer was responsible for the suc-
cessful plaintiffs attorney's fees even when success was achieved through
a settlement. 95 Against this backdrop, the settlement process was typically
bifurcated. Counsel would negotiate a settlement on the merits, and then
would attempt to agree on a fee award. In these circumstances, the em-
ployer could never be assured of confidentiality. If the parties failed to
settle the fee issue, plaintiff's counsel could make a formal motion for an
award. 96 Among the criteria used to fix a reasonable fee, the Court was
required to consider the plaintiff's degree of success.97 Thus, the amount of
the settlement would become part of the court record, even if the settlement
agreement was not.
This scenario changed dramatically as a result of two Supreme Court
decisions in the mid-1980s. Marek v. Chesny approved lump sum settle-
92. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (2005); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 431.
93. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REv. 183 (2003); Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back
Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1312-20 (1990).
94. See generally Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990); see also Kotkin, supra note 93, at
1316-17.
95. See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
96. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990s: The Dichotomy Between Reality
and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 212-21 (1997).
97. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ment offers in civil rights actions.98 Noting that the defendants were justi-
fiably reluctant to makes offers when they would still be exposed to court-
awarded attorney's fees in any amount, the Court stated, "There is no evi-
dence.., that Congress ... had any thought that civil rights claims were to
be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is
concerned." 99 In Evans v. Jeff D., the Court held that the Civil Rights Fee
Act did not prohibit the simultaneous negotiation of defendant's liability on
the merits and attorney's fees, even if the defendant insisted upon a waiver
of fees. 100 Thus the era of bifurcated negotiations ended. In both decisions,
the Court privileged the facilitation of settlement over the goal of attracting
competent counsel to enforce civil rights laws.
As a result of these two decisions, employment discrimination lawyers
adopted contingency fee arrangements to protect themselves from demands
for fee waivers, and to eliminate the ethical conflict inherent in deciding
how to split lump-sum settlements with plaintiffs. 101 Discrimination claims
became indistinguishable from tort claims in the settlement process, and
confidentiality became an easily obtained concession. 102 The sense of pub-
lic purpose upon which the civil rights statutes rested was lost.
As discussed above, confidential settlements in civil rights actions do
not directly jeopardize public safety. Their impact is cumulative, in that
they inhibit the perception of discrimination by the public, the judiciary,
and policy makers. Moreover, they vastly reduce the database from which
lawyers can evaluate cases and counsel clients about prospective recovery.
Plaintiffs' counsel are disadvantaged during the negotiation process be-
cause defendants enjoy the "repeat player" advantage. The absence of a
settlement database also affects the ability of judges to assist in the settle-
ment process. A project of the federal district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois recognizes this effect and develops a simple and elegant
solution. 103
The Chicago judges recognized that, given the tiny percentage of
cases that go to trial, "[s]ettlements ... represent important practical prece-
dent for courts and litigants, providing useful information that can assist
clients, lawyers, and judges in settling other cases." 104 Individual experi-
ences of judges and lawyers are necessarily limited, however. To make data
98. 473 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1985).
99. Id. at 10; see also Kotkin, supra note 10, manuscript at 107-19.
100. 475 U.S. 717, 734-40(1986).
101. Kotkin, supra note 10, manuscript at 107-19.
102. See id.
103. Denlow & Shack, supra note 14.
104. Id. at 19.
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available, the judges decided to create their own settlement database. After
a successful settlement conference, the judge prepares and submits a confi-
dential settlement summary, which is compiled monthly into a report for
the judges' use. The report tracks the type of case; itemized damages; ini-
tial demands and offers; stage of litigation (whether the plaintiff survived
summary judgment, for example); and settlement terms and amounts.
The judges decided to collect even more details for employment dis-
crimination and civil rights cases "because they represent the largest cate-
gory of cases for which judges conduct settlement conferences."' 105 They
track the specific nature of the claim (whether race or sex, for example, or
some combination of protected categories), specific type of adverse em-
ployment action (e.g., failure to promote or termination), and length of
employment. 106 Not only are the dollar amounts of settlements recorded,
but other terms-such as confidentiality clauses-are included. 107 It is
estimated that the report form takes under five minutes to complete. 108 To
assure confidentiality, no party names or case numbers are recorded. 109
These reports are also available to attorneys and litigants in particular
cases. 110 The Chicago judges are exploring the possibility of performing
further analysis of the data collected in 645 cases over three and a half
years, and suggest that "[g]iven the importance of the data, courts might
develop mechanisms to make this information available to the pub-
lic . .. ."III
The Chicago experiment responds to several of the harms created by
invisible settlements, particularly if the data become publicly available. It
responds to the need for settlement benchmarks, and it would be useful in
informing the public debate about the prevalence of serious discrimination
in the workplace. It does not, however, address the general deterrence goals
of civil rights legislation. If settlements are invisible and trials disappear,
there are no cautionary tales for employers to ensure that they carefully
monitor and address workplace bias, and there is no risk of public approba-
tion for employers who fail to provide equal opportunities. 112
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at22.
111. Id. I recently began an empirical study of the Chicago data, with the permission of the court.
112. This was the lower court's concern in Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.
2004). In this sex discrimination action, the parties agreed to confidential settlement, but the amount
was revealed at a conference upon the urging of the trial judge, who then "wondered aloud why the
public should not know about discrimination at a major banking institution." Id. at 136. The trial judge
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Judith Resnik points to the only solution for this dilemma: the creation
of "information-forcing" rules.1 13 Andrew Goldstein convincingly demon-
strates, however, that generalized "sunshine" legislation has not been an
effective remedy because such laws are too easily side-stepped by using
confidential settlement contracts that are unlikely to require judicial en-
forcement.114 Rules that specifically mandate judicial approval of settle-
ments (such as the Fair Labor Standards Act1 15), or reporting of outcomes
(such as malpractice awards1 16), better achieve the goal of public access.
In the employment discrimination context, such a rule is not without
precedent. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has adopted a policy that when it litigates in its own name, as it is author-
ized to do by statute, it will not enter into confidential settlements. It re-
quires that "resolutions. . .must contain all settlement terms and be filed in
the public court record." 117 The agency considers its policy as mandated
both by the right of the public to "have access to the results of the agency's
litigation activities," and because "one of the principal purposes of en-
forcement actions... is to deter violations by the party being sued and by
other entities subject to the laws. Other entities cannot be deterred by the
relief obtained in a particular case unless they learn what that relief
was."1 18 The EEOC could, by regulation, mandate the same requirement in
litigation between private parties. The Department of Labor recently took
this step with regard to claims brought under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, another legislative effort to bring progressive social policy to
the workplace. 119 Its regulations require agency or judicial approval of any
settlement. 12 0
For those who argue that cases would not settle without confidential-
ity, the EEOC and Department of Labor policies counsel otherwise. In
then issued an opinion unsealing certain discovery documents, and referred to "a multi-million dollar
settlement." Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02 Civ. 4791 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11180, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003). The Second Circuit viewed the inclusion of this language as a serious abuse
of discretion but had no power to remedy the breach of confidentiality because the lower court opinion
had become immediately available online. Gambale, 377 F. 3d. at 143-44.
113. Resnik, supra note 5, at 528-30, 559.
114. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 392.
115. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 392.
116. See Kotkin, supra note 10; Resnik, supra note 5, at 562--64 (discussing state statutes that require
disclosure in malpractice awards).
117. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, REGIONAL
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 58 (2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/manual/3-4-
a_settlementstandards.html [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL].
118. Id.
119. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (prohibiting employees from waiving their rights under the FMLA);
Kotkin, supra note 10, manuscript page 147.
120. Kotkin, supra note 10, manuscript page 116; EEOC MANUAL, supra note 117, at 51.
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addition, such a regulation would have a salutary side effect: employers
who strongly value confidentiality would have an added impetus to resolve
claims through mediation at the agency level, where confidentiality is the
rule.121
CONCLUSION
Questions of technology loom large over the secrecy debate. Several
authors in this Symposium express the concern that the increase in data
accessibility necessitates careful consideration of privacy rights. On the
other hand, technology can be used affirmatively to remedy at least some of
the harms engendered by secret discovery and secret settlements.
It is both unlikely and undesirable that the clock should turn back-
wards with regard to alternative dispute resolution and managerial judging.
We should instead look forward to the possibility that these trends can
achieve their goals of efficiency and economy without sacrificing the de-
mocratic values of public adjudication that Judith Resnik elucidates. If
mandatory arbitration of employment claims cannot be undone legisla-
tively, at least decisions by the private judiciary can be made public in eas-
ily accessible databases. The fear that courthouses will be overwhelmed
with paper discovery seems almost quaint when dozens of deposition tran-
scripts can be stored on a single CD.
It is true, as Richard Marcus notes, that prior to the technology revolu-
tion, access to discovery required a trip to the courthouse, not a click of the
mouse. But then, a visitor to the courthouse or a member of the press could
also find a trial to watch, an unlikely occurrence today. If secret settlements
cannot be effectively regulated by rule-making, we need to replace at least
part of the function previously served by verdict and settlement reporters
by creating publicly available databases along the lines of the Chicago
project.
121. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 117, at 51.
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